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Abstract
The search for a scientific theory of consciousness should result in theories that are falsifiable. How-
ever, here we show that falsification is especially problematic for theories of consciousness. We formally
describe the standard experimental setup for testing these theories. Based on a theory’s application
to some physical system, such as the brain, testing requires comparing a theory’s predicted experience
(given some internal observables of the system like brain imaging data) with an inferred experience (using
report or behavior). If there is a mismatch between inference and prediction, a theory is falsified. We
show that if inference and prediction are independent, it follows that any minimally informative theory
of consciousness is automatically falsified. This is deeply problematic since the field’s reliance on report
or behavior to infer conscious experiences implies such independence, so this fragility affects many con-
temporary theories of consciousness. Furthermore, we show that if inference and prediction are strictly
dependent, it follows that a theory is unfalsifiable. This affects theories which claim consciousness to be
determined by report or behavior. Finally, we explore possible ways out of this dilemma.
1 Introduction
Successful scientific fields move from exploratory studies and observations to the point where theories are
proposed that can offer precise predictions. Within neuroscience the attempt to understand consciousness
has moved out of the exploratory stage and there are now a number of theories of consciousness capable of
predictions that have been advanced by various authors (Koch et al., 2016).
At this point in the field’s development falsification has become relevant. In general, scientific theories
should strive to make testable predictions (Popper, 1959). In the search for a scientific theory of conscious-
ness, falsifiability must be considered explicitly as it is commonly assumed that consciousness itself cannot
be directly observed, instead it can only be inferred based off of report or behavior.
Contemporary neuroscientific theories of consciousness first began to be proposed in the early 1990s
(Crick, 1994). Some have been based directly on neurophysiological correlates, such as proposing that
consciousness is associated with neurons firing at a particular frequency (Crick and Koch, 1990) or activity
in some particular area of the brain like the claustrum (Crick and Koch, 2005). Other theories have focused
more on the dynamics of neural processing, such as the degree of recurrent neural connectivity (Lamme,
2006). Others yet have focused on the “global workspace” of the brain, based on how signals are propagated
across different brain regions (Baars, 1997). Specifically, Global Neuronal Workspace theory claims that
consciousness is the result of an “avalanche” or “ignition” of widespread neural activity created by an
interconnected but dispersed network of neurons with long-range connections (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004).
Another avenue of research strives to derive a theory of consciousness from analysis of phenomenal expe-
rience. The most promising example thereof is Integrated Information Theory (Tononi, 2004, 2008; Oizumi
et al., 2014). Historically, Integrated Information Theory is the first well-formalized theory of consciousness.
It was the first (and arguably may still be the lone) theory that makes precise quantitative predictions about
∗Johannes.Kleiner@lmu.de
†erik.hoel@tufts.edu
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
03
54
1v
2 
 [q
-b
io.
NC
]  
9 J
ul 
20
20
both the contents and level of consciousness (Tononi, 2004). Specifically, the theory takes the form of a
function, the input of which is data derived from some physical system’s internal observables, while the
output of this function are predictions about the contents of consciousness (represented mathematically as
an element of an experience space) and the level of consciousness (represented by a scalar value Φ).
Both Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) and Integrated Information Theory (IIT) have gained widespread
popularity, sparked general interest in consciousness, and have led to dozens if not hundreds of new empirical
studies (Massimini et al., 2005; Del Cul et al., 2007; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Gosseries et al., 2014;
Wenzel et al., 2019). Indeed, there are already significant resources being spent attempting to falsify either
GNW or IIT in the form of a global effort pre-registering predictions from the two theories so that testing
can be conducted in controlled circumstances by researchers across the world (Ball., 2019; Reardon, 2019).
We therefore often refer to both GNW and IIT as exemplar theories within consciousness research and show
how our results apply to both. However, our results and reasoning apply to most contemporary theories, e.g.
(Lau and Rosenthal, 2011; Chang et al., 2019), particularly in their ideal forms. Note that we refer to both
“theories” of consciousness and also “models” of consciousness, and use these interchangeably (Seth, 2007).
Due to IIT’s level of formalization as a theory, it has triggered the most in-depth responses, expansions,
and criticisms (Cerullo, 2015; Bayne, 2018; Mediano et al., 2019; Kleiner and Tull, 2020) since well-formalized
theories are much easier to criticize than non-formalized theories. Recently one criticism levied against IIT
was based on how the theory predicts feedfoward neural networks have zero Φ and recurrent neural networks
have non-zero Φ. Since a given recurrent neural network can be “unfolded” into a feedfoward one while
preserving its output function, this has been argued to render IIT outside the realm of science (Doerig et al.,
2019). Replies have criticised the assumptions which underlie the derivation of this argument (Kleiner, 2020;
Tsuchiya et al., 2019).
Here we frame and expand concerns around testing and falsification of theories by examining a more
general question: what are the conditions under which theories of consciousness (beyond IIT alone) can be
falsified? We outline a parsimonious description of theory testing with minimal assumptions based on first
principles. In this agnostic setup falsifying a theory of consciousness is the result of finding a mismatch
between the inferred contents of consciousness (usually based on report or behavior) and the contents of
consciousness as predicted by the theory (based on the internal observables of the system under question).
This mismatch between prediction and inference is critical for an empirically meaningful scientific agenda,
because a theory’s prediction of the state and content of consciousness on its own cannot be assessed. For
instance, imagine a theory that predicts (based on internal observables like brain dynamics) that a subject is
seeing an image of a cat. Without any reference to report or outside information, there can be no falsification
of this theory, since it cannot be assessed whether the subject was actually seeing a “dog” rather than “cat.”
Falsifying a theory of consciousness is based on finding such mismatches between reported experiences and
predictions.
In the following work, we formalize this by describing the prototypical experimental setup for testing a
theory of consciousness. We come to a surprising conclusion: a widespread experimental assumption implies
that most contemporary theories of consciousness are already falsified.
The assumption in question is the independence of an experimenter’s inferences about consciousness from
a theory’s predictions. To demonstrate the problems this independence creates for contemporary theories, we
introduce a “substitution argument.” This argument is based on the fact that many systems are equivalent
in their reports (e.g., their outputs are identical for the same inputs) and yet their internal observables may
differ greatly. This argument constitutes both a generalization and correction of the “unfolding argument”
against IIT presented in Doerig et al. (2019). Examples of such substitutions may involve substituting a
brain with a Turing machine or a cellular automaton since both types of systems are capable of universal
computation (Turing, 1937; Wolfram, 1984) and hence may emulate the brain’s responses, or replacing a
deep neural network with a single-layer neural network, since both types of networks can approximate any
given function (Hornik et al., 1989; Scha¨fer and Zimmermann, 2006).
Crucially, our results do not imply that falsifications are impossible. Rather, they show that the inde-
pendence assumption implies that whenever there is an experiment where a theory’s predictions based on
internal observables and a system’s reports agree, there exists also an actual physical system that falsifies
the theory. One consequence is that the “unfolding argument” concerning IIT (Doerig et al., 2019) is merely
a small subset of a much larger issue that affects all contemporary theories which seek to make predictions
about experience off of internal observables. Our conclusion shows that if independence holds, all such
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theories come “pre-falsified.” Thus, instead of putting the blame of this problem on individual theories
of consciousness, we show that it is due to issues of falsification in the scientific study of consciousness,
particularly the field’s contemporary useage of report or behavior to infer conscious experiences.
A simple response to avoid this problem is to claim that report and inference are not independent. This
is the case, e.g., in behaviorist theories of consciousness, but arguably also in Global Workspace Theory
(Baars, 2005), the “attention schema” theory of consciousness (Graziano and Webb, 2015) or “fame in the
brain” (Dennett, 1993) proposals. We study this answer in detail and find that making a theory’s predictions
and an experimenter’s inferences strictly dependent leads to pathological unfalsifiability.
Our results show that if independence of prediction and inference holds true, as in contemporary cases
where report about experiences is relied upon, it is likely that no current theory of consciousness is correct.
Alternatively, if the assumption of independence is rejected, theories rapidly become unfalsifiable. While this
dilemma may seem like a highly negative conclusion, we take it to show that our understanding of testing
theories of consciousness may need to change to deal with these issues.
2 Formal description of testing theories
Here we provide a formal framework for experimentally testing a particular class of theories of conscious-
ness. The class we consider makes predictions about the conscious experience of physical systems based on
observations or measurements. This class describes many contemporary theories, including leading theories
such as Integrated Information Theory (Oizumi et al., 2014), Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (Dehaene
and Changeux, 2004), Predictive Processing (when applied to account for conscious experience (Dolega and
Dewhurst, 2020; Clark, 2019; Seth, 2014; Hobson et al., 2014; Hohwy, 2012)) or Higher Order Thought
Theory (Rosenthal, 2002). In some cases, contemporary theories in this class may lack the specificity to ac-
tually make precise predictions in their current form. Therefore, the formalisms we introduce may sometimes
describe a more advanced form of a theory, one that can actually make predictions.
In the following section, we introduce the necessary terms to define how to falsify this class of theories:
how measurement of a physical system’s observables results in datasets (Section 2.1), how a theory makes use
of those datasets to offer predictions about consciousness (Section 2.2), how an experimenter makes inferences
about a physical system’s experiences (Section 2.3), and finally how falsification of a theory occurs when
there is a mismatch between a theory’s prediction and an experimenter’s inference (Section 2.4). In Section
2.5 we give a summary of the introduced terms. In subsequent sections we explore the consequences of
this setup, such as how all contemporary theories are already falsified if the data used by inferences and
predictions are independent, and also how theories are unfalsifiable if this is changed to a strict form of
dependency.
2.1 Experiments
All experimental attempts to either falsify or confirm a member of the class of theories we consider begin
by examining some particular physical system which has some specific physical configuration, state, or
dynamics, p. For example, in IIT, the class of systems P may be some Markov chains, set of logic gates, or
neurons in the brain, and every p ∈ P denotes that system being in a particular state at some time t. On
the other hand, for Global Neuronal Workspace, P might comprise the set of long-range cortical connections
that make up the global workspace of the brain, with p being the activity of that global workspace at that
time.
Testing a physical system necessitates experiments or observations. For instance, neuroimaging tools like
fMRI or EEG have to be used in order to obtain information about the brain. This information is used to
create datasets such as functional networks, wiring diagrams, models, or transition probability matrices. To
formalize this process, we denote by O all possible datasets that can result from observations of P . Each
o ∈ O is one particular dataset, the result of carrying out some set of measurements on p. We denote the
datasets that can result from measurements on p as obs(p). Formally:
obs : P  O , (1)
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where obs is a correspondence, which is a “generalized function” that allows more than one element in the
image obs(p) (functions are a special case of correspondences). A correspondence is necessary because, for a
given p, various possible datasets may arise, e.g., due to different measurement techniques such as fMRI vs.
EEG, or due to the stochastic behaviour of the system, or due to varying experimental parameters. In the
real world, data obtained from experiments may be incomplete or noisy, or neuroscientific findings difficult
to reproduce (Gilmore et al., 2017). Thus for every p ∈ P , there is a whole class of datasets which can result
from the experiment.
Note that obs describes the experiment, the choice of observables, and all conditions during an experiment
that generates the dataset o necessary to apply the theory, which may differ from theory to theory, such as
interventions in the case of IIT. In all realistic cases, the correspondence obs is likely quite complicated since
it describes the whole experimental setup. For our argument it simply suffices that this mapping exists, even
if it is not known in detail.
It is also worth noting here that all leading neuroscientific theories of consciousness, from IIT to GNW,
assume that experiences are not observable or directly measurable when applying the theory to physical
systems. That is, experiences themselves are never identified or used in obs, but are rather inferred based
on some dataset o that contains report or other behavioural indicators.
Next we explore how the datasets in O are used to make predictions about the experience of a physical
system.
2.2 Predictions
A theory of consciousness makes predictions about the experience of some physical system in some config-
uration, state, or dynamics, p, based on some dataset o. To this end, a theory carries within its definition
a set or space E whose elements correspond to various different conscious experiences a system could have.
The interpretation of this set varies from theory to theory, ranging from descriptions of the level of conscious
experience in early versions of IIT, descriptions of the level and content of conscious experience in contem-
porary IIT (Kleiner and Tull, 2020), or the description only of whether a presented stimuli is experienced in
GNW or HOT. We sometimes refer to elements e of E simply as experiences.
Formally, this means that a prediction considers an experimental dataset o ∈ O (determined by obs)
and specifies an element of the experience space E. We denote this as pred, for “prediction,” which is a
map from O to E. The details of how individual datasets are being used to make predictions again do not
matter for the sake of our investigation. What matters is that a procedure exists, and this is captured by
pred. However, we have to take into account that a single dataset o ∈ O may not predict only one single
experience. In general, pred may only allow an experimenter to constrain experience of the system in that
it only specifies a subset of all experiences a theory models. We denote this subset by pred(o). Thus, pred
is also a correspondence
pred : O E .
Shown in Figure 1 are the full set of terms needed to formally define how most contemporary theories
of consciousness make predictions about experience. So far, what we have said is very general. Indeed, the
force and generalizability of our argument comes from the fact that we do not have to define pred explicitly
for the various models we consider. It suffices that it exists, in some form or the other, for the models under
consideration.
It is crucial to note that predicting states of consciousness alone does not suffice to test a model of
consciousness. Some have previously criticized theories of consciousness, IIT in particular, just based off
of their counter-intuitive predictions. An example is the criticism that relatively simply grid-like networks
have high Φ (Aaronson, 2014; Tononi, 2014). However, debates about counter-intuitive predictions are not
meaningful by themselves, since pred alone does not contain enough information to say whether a theory is
true or false. The most a theory could be criticized for is either not fitting our own phenomenology or not
being parsimonious enough, neither of which are necessarily violated by counter-intuitive predictions. For
example, it may actually be parsimonious to assume that many physical systems have consciousness (Goff,
2017). That is, speculation about acceptable predictions by theories of consciousness must implicitly rely on
a comparative reference to be meaningful, and speculations that are not explicit about their reference are
uninformative.
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Figure 1: We assume that an experimental setup apt for a particular model of consciousness has been chosen for some
class of physical systems P , wherein p ∈ P represents the dynamics or configurations of a particular physical system.
O then denotes all datasets that can arise from observations or measurements on P . Measuring the observables of
p maps to datasets o ∈ O, which is denoted by the obs correspondence. E represents the mathematical description
of experience given by the theory or model of consciousness under consideration. In the simplest case, this is just
a set whose elements indicate whether a stimulus has been perceived consciously or not, but far more complicated
structures can arise (e.g., in IIT). The correspondence pred describes the process of prediction as a map from O to
E.
2.3 Inferences
As discussed in the previous section, a theory is unfalsifiable given just predictions alone, and so pred must
be compared to something else. Ideally this would be the actual conscious experience of the system under
investigation. However, as noted previously, the class of theories we focus on here assumes that experience
itself is not part of the observables. For this reason, the experience of a system must be inferred separately
from a theory’s prediction to create a basis of comparison. Most commonly, such inferences are based on
reports. For instance, an inference might be based on an experimental participant reporting on the switching
of some perceptually bistable image (Blake et al., 2014) or on reports about seen vs. unseen images in
masking paradigms (Alais et al., 2010).
It has been pointed out that report in a trial may interfere with the actual isolation of consciousness, and
there has recently been the introduction of so-called “no-report paradigms” (Tsuchiya et al., 2015). In these
cases, report is first correlated to some autonomous phenomenon like optokinetic nystagmus (stereotyped
eye movement), and then the experimenter can use this instead of the subject’s direct reports to infer their
experiences. Indeed, there can even be simpler cases where report is merely assumed: e.g., that in showing
a red square a participant will experience a red square without necessarily asking the participant, since
previously that participant has proved compos mentis. Similarly, in cases of non-humans incapable of verbal
report, “report” can be broadly construed as behavior or output.
All these cases can be broadly described as being a case of inference off of some data. This data might
be actual reports (like a participant’s button pushes) or may be based off of physiological reactions (like
no-report paradigms) or may be the outputs of a neural network or set of logic gates, such as the results of
an image classification task (LeCun et al., 2015). Therefore, the inference can be represented as a function,
inf(o), between a dataset o generated by observation or measurement of the physical system, and the set of
postulated experiences in the model of consciousness, E:
inf : O→ E .
Defining inf as a function means that we assume that for every experimental dataset o, one single
experience in E is inferred during the experiment. Here we use a function instead of a correspondence
for technical and formal ease, which does affect our results (if two correspondences to the same space are
given, one of them can be turned into a function using quotient spaces). The inf function is flexible enough
to encompass both direct report, no-report, input/output analysis, and also assumed-report cases. It is a
mapping that describes the process of inferring the conscious experience of a system from data recorded in
the experiments. Both inf and pred are depicted in Figure 2.
It is worth noting that we have used here the same class O as in the definition of the prediction mapping
pred above. This makes sense because the inference process also uses data obtained in experimental trials,
such as reports by a subject. So both pred and inf can be described to operate on the same total dataset
measured, even though they usually use different parts of this dataset (cf. below).
2.4 Falsification
We have now introduced all elements which are necessary to formally say what a falsification of a theory of
consciousness is. To falsify a theory of consciousness requires mismatch between an experimenter’s inference
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Figure 2: Two maps are necessary for a full experimental setup, one that describes a theory’s predictions about
experience (pred), another that describes the experimenter’s inference about it (inf). Both map from a dataset o ∈ O
collected in an experimental trail to some subset of experiences described by the model, E.
(generally based on report) and the predicted consciousness of the subject. In order to describe this, we
consider some particular experimental trial, as well as inf and pred.
Definition 2.1. There is a falsification at o ∈ O if we have
inf(o) 6∈ pred(o) . (2)
This definition can be spelled out in terms of individual components of E. To this end, for any given
dataset o ∈ O, let er := inf(o) denote the experience that is being inferred, and let ep ∈ obs(o) be one of
the experiences that is predicted based off of some dataset. Then (2) simply states that we have ep 6= er for
all possible predictions ep. None of the predicted states of experience is equal to the inferred experience.
What does Equation (2) mean? There are two cases which are possible. Either, the prediction based
on the theory of consciousness is correct and the inferred experience is wrong. Or the prediction is wrong,
so that in this case the model would be falsified. In short: Either the prediction process or the inference
process is wrong.
We remark that if there is a dataset o on which the inference procedure inf or the prediction procedure
pred cannot be used, then this dataset cannot be used in falsifying a model of consciousness. Thus, when it
comes to falsifications, we can restrict to datasets o for which both procedures are defined.
In order to understand in more detail what is going on if (2) holds, we have to look into a single dataset
o ∈ O. This will be of use later.
Generally, inf and obs will make use of different part of the data obtained in an experimental trial. E.g.,
in the context of IIT or GNW, data about the internal structure and state of the brain will be used for the
prediction. This data can be obtained from an fMRI scan or EEG measurement. The state of consciousness
on the other hand can be inferred from verbal reports. Pictorially, we may represent this as in Figure 3. We
use the following notation:
oi For a chosen dataset o ∈ O, we denote the part of the dataset which is used for the prediction process
by oi (for ‘internal’ data). This can be thought of as data about the internal workings of the system.
We call oi the prediction data in o.
or For a chosen dataset o ∈ O, we denote the part of the dataset which is used for inferring the state of
experience by or (for ‘report’ data). We call it the inference data in o.
Note that in both cases, the subscript can be read similarly as the notation for restricting a set.
2.5 Summary
In summary, for testing of a theory of consciousness we have introduced the following notion:
P denotes a class of physical systems, each in various different configurations. In most cases, every p ∈ P
thus describes a physical system in a particular state, dynamical trajectory, or configuration.
obs is a correspondence which contains all details on how the measurements are set up and what is
measured. It describes how measurement results (datasets) are determined by a system configuration
under investigation. This correspondence is given, though usually not explicitly known, once a choice
of measurement scheme has been made.
6
po ∈ O
pred(o)
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oi
inf(o)
er
pred(o)
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E
Figure 3: This figure represents the same setup as Figure 2. The left circle depicts one single dataset o. oi
(orange) is the part of the dataset used for prediction. or (green) is the part of the dataset used for inferring
the state of experience. Usually the green area comprises verbal reports or button presses, whereas the
orange area comprises the data obtained from brain scans. The right circle depicts the experience space E
of a theory under consideration. ep denotes a predicted experience while er denotes the inferred experience.
Therefore, in total, to represent some specific experimental trial we use p ∈ P , o ∈ O, er ∈ E and ep ∈ E,
where ep ∈ pred(o).
O is the class of all possible datasets that can result from observations or measurements of the systems
in the class P . Any single experimental trail results in a single dataset o ∈ O, whose data is used for
making predictions based on the theory of consciousness and for inference purposes.
pred describes the process of making predictions by applying some theory of consciousness to a dataset o.
It is therefore a mapping from O to E.
E denotes the space of possible experiences specified by the theory under consideration. The result of
the prediction is a subset of this space, denoted as pred(o). Elements of this subset are denoted by ei
and describe predicted experiences.
inf describes the process of inferring a state of experience from some observed data, e.g. verbal reports,
button presses or using no-report paradigms. Inferred experiences are denoted by er.
3 The substitution argument
Substitutions are changes of physical systems (i.e., the substitution of one for another) that leave the inference
data invariant, but may change the result of the prediction process. A specific case of substitution, the
unfolding of a reentrant neural network to a feed-forward one, was recently applied to IIT to argue that IIT
cannot explain consciousness (Doerig et al., 2019).
Here we show that, in general, the contemporary notion of falsification in the science of consciousness
exhibits this fundamental flaw for almost all contemporary theories, rather than being a problem for a
particular theory. This flaw is based on the independence between the data used for inferences about
consciousness (like reports) and the data used to make predictions about consciousness. We discuss various
responses to this flaw in Section ??.
We begin by defining what a substitution is in Section 3.1, show that it implies falsifications in Section 3.2,
and analyze the particularly problematic case of universal substitutions in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we
prove that universal substitutions exist if prediction and inference data are independent and give some
examples of already-known cases.
3.1 Substitutions
In order to define formally what a substitution is, we work with the inference content or of a dataset o as
introduced in Section 2.4. We first denote the class of all physical configurations which could have produced
7
the inference content or upon measurement by Por . Using the correspondence obs which describes the
relation between physical systems and measurement results, this can be defined as
Por := { p ∈ P | or ∈ obs(p) } , (3)
where obs(p) denotes all possible datasets that can be measured if the system p is under investigation and
where or ∈ obs(p) is a shorthand for o ∈ obs(p) with inference content or.
Any map of the form S : Por → Por takes a system configuration p which can produce inference content or
to another system’s configuration S(p) which can produce the same inference content. This allows us to define
what a substitution is formally. In what follows, the ◦ indicates the composition of the correspondences obs
and pred to give a correspondence from P to E, which could also be denoted as pred(obs(p)), and ∩ denotes
the intersection of sets.
Definition 3.1. There is a or-substitution if there is a transformation S : Por → Por such that at least for
one p ∈ Por
pred ◦ obs(p) ∩ pred ◦ obs(S(p)) = ∅ . (4)
In words, a substitution requires there to be a transformation S which keeps the inference data constant
but changes the prediction of the system. So much in fact that the prediction of the original configuration p
and of the transformed configuration S(p) are fully incompatible, i.e. there is no single experience e which is
contained in both predictions. Given some inference data or, an or-substitution then requires this to be the
case for at least one system configuration p that gives this inference data. In other words, the transformation
S is such that for at least one p, the predictions change completely, while the inference content or is preserved.
A pictorial definition of substitutions is given in Figure 4. We remark that if obs were a function, so that
obs(p) only contained one element, Equation (4) would be equivalent to pred(obs(p)) 6= pred(obs(S(p))).
We will find below that the really problematic case arises if there is an or-substitution for every possible
inference content or. We call this case a universal substitution:
Definition 3.2. There is a universal substitution if there is an or-substitution for every or.
We recall that according to the notation introduced in Section 2.4, the inference content of any dataset
o ∈ O is denoted by or (adding the subscript r). Thus the requirement is that there is an or-substitution for
every inference data that can pertain in the experiment under consideration (for every inference data that
is listed in O).
3.2 Substitutions imply falsifications
The force of our argument comes from the fact that if there are substitutions, then this necessarily leads to
mismatches between inferences and predictions. This is shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. If there is a or-substitution, there is a falsification at some o ∈ O.
Proof. Let p be the physical system in Definition 3.1 and define p′ = S(p). Let o ∈ obs(p) be a dataset
of p which has inference content or and let o
′ be a dataset of p′ which has the same inference content or,
guaranteed to exist by the definition of Por in (3). Equation (4) implies that
pred(o) ∩ pred(o′) = ∅ . (5)
Since, however, or = o
′
r, we have inf(o) = inf(o
′). Thus we have either inf(o) 6∈ pred(o) or inf(o′) 6∈
pred(o′), or both. Thus there is either a falsification at o, a falsification at o′, or both.
The last lemma shows that if there are substitutions, then there are necessarily falsifications. This might,
however, not be considered too problematic, since it could always be the case that the model is right whereas
the inferred experience is wrong. Inaccessible predictions are not unusual in science. A fully problematic
case only pertains for universal substitutions, i.e., if there is an or-substitution for every inference content
or that can arise in an experiment under consideration.
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T (p)
o resp. o′
or = o
′
r
oi
p
o′i
pred(o)
inf(o)
er = e
′
r
pred(o)
ep
E
pred(o′)e
′
p
pred(o′)
Figure 4: This picture illustrates substitutions. Assume that some dataset o with inference content or
is given. A substitution is a transformation S of physical systems which leaves the inference content or
invariant but which changes the result of the prediction process. Thus whereas p and S(p) have the same
inference content or, the prediction content of experimental datasets is different; different in fact to such
an extend that the predictions of consciousness based on these datasets are incompatible (illustrated by the
non-overlapping gray circles on the right). Here we have used that by definition of Por , every p˜ ∈ Por yields
at least one dataset o′ with the same inference content as o and have identified o and o′ in the drawing.
3.3 Universal substitutions imply complete falsification
In Section 2.4, we have defined falsifications for individual datasets o ∈ O. Using the ‘insight view’ of single
datasets, we can refine this definition somewhat by relating it to the inference content only.
Definition 3.4. There is an or-falsification if there is a falsification for some o ∈ O which has inference
content or.
This definition is weaker than the original definition, because among all datasets which have inference
content or, only one needs to exhibit a falsification. Using this notion, the next lemma specifies the exact
relation between substitutions and falsifications.
Lemma 3.5. If there is an or-substitution, there is an or-falsification.
Proof. This lemma follows directly from the proof of Lemma 3.3 because the datasets o and o′ used in that
proof both have inference content or.
This finally allows us to show our first main result. It shows that if a universal substitution exists, the
theory of consciousness under consideration is falsified. We explain the meaning of this proposition after the
proof.
Proposition 3.6. If there is a universal substitution, there is an or-falsification for all possible inference
contents or.
Proof. By definition of universal substitution, there is an or-substitution for every or. Thus the claim follows
directly from Lemma 3.5.
In combination with Definition 3.4, this proposition states that for every possible report (or any other
type of inference procedure, cf. our use of terminology in Section 2.4), there is a dataset o which contains
the report’s data and for which we have
inf(or) /∈ pred(o) , (6)
where we have slightly abused notation in writing inf(or) instead of inf(o) for clarity. This implies that one
of two cases needs to pertain: Either at least one of the inferred experiences inf(or) is correct, in which case
the corresponding prediction is wrong and the theory needs to be considered falsified. The only other option
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is that for all inference contents or, the prediction pred(o) is correct, which qua (6) implies that no single
inference inf(or) points at the correct experience, so that the inference procedure is completely wrong. This
shows that Proposition 3.6 can equivalently be stated as follows.
Proposition 3.7. If there is a universal substitution, either every single inference operation is wrong or the
theory under consideration is already falsified.
Next, we discuss under which circumstances a universal substitution exists.
3.4 When does a universal substitution exist?
In the last section, we have seen that if a universal substitution exists, this has strong consequences. In this
section, we discuss under what conditions universal substitutions exist.
3.4.1 Theories need to be minimally informative
We have taken great care above to make sure that our notion of prediction is compatible with incomplete or
noisy datasets. This is the reason why pred is a correspondence, the most general object one could consider.
For the purpose of this section, we add a gentle assumption which restricts pred slightly: we assume that
every prediction carries at least a minimal amount of information. In our case, this means that for every
prediction pred(o), there is at least one other prediction pred(o′) which is different from pred(o). Put in
simple terms, this means that we don’t consider theories of consciousness which have only a single prediction.
In order to take this into account, for every o ∈ O, we define o¯ := obs(obs−1(o)), which comprises exactly
all those datasets which can be generated by physical systems p that also generate o. When applying our
previous definitions, this can be fleshed out as
o¯ = { o′ | ∃ p such that o ∈ obs(p) and o′ ∈ obs(p) } . (7)
Using this, we can state our minimal information assumption in a way that is compatible with the general
setup displayed in Figure 2:
We assume that the theories of consciousness under consideration are minimally informative in that for
every o ∈ O, there exists an o′ ∈ O such that
pred(o¯) ∩ pred(o¯′) = ∅ . (8)
3.4.2 Inference and prediction data are independent
We have already noted, that in most experiments, the prediction content oi and inference content or consist
of different parts of a dataset. What is more, they are usually assumed to be independent, in the sense that
changes in oi are possible while keeping or constant. This is captured by the next definition.
Definition 3.8. Inference and prediction data are independent if for any oi, o
′
i and or, there is a variation
ν : P → P (9)
such that oi ∈ obs(p), o′i ∈ obs(ν(p)) but or ∈ obs(p) and or ∈ obs(ν(p)) for some p ∈ P .
Here, we use the same shorthand as in (3). For example, the requirement oi ∈ obs(p) is a shorthand for
there being an o ∈ obs(p) which has prediction content oi. Note that if inference and prediction data are not
independent, e.g. because they have a common cause, problems of tautologies loom large, cf. Section ??.
Throughout the text we often refer to Definition 3.8 simply as “independence”.
3.4.3 Universal substitutions exist
Combining the last two sections, we can now prove that universal substitutions exist.
Proposition 3.9. If inference and prediction data are independent, universal substitutions exist.
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Proof. To show that a universal substitution exists, we need to show that for every o ∈ O, an or-substitution
exists (Definition 3.1). Thus assume that an arbitrary o ∈ O is given. The minimal information assumption
guarantees that there is an o′ such that Equation (8) holds. As before, we denote the prediction content of
o and o′ by oi and o′i, respectively, and the inference content of o by or.
Since inference and prediction data are independent, there exists a p ∈ P as well as a ν : P → P such
that oi ∈ obs(p), o′i ∈ obs(ν(p)), or ∈ obs(p) and or ∈ obs(ν(p)). By Definition (7), the first two of these four
conditions imply that obs(p) ⊂ o¯ and obs(ν(p)) ⊂ o¯′. Thus Equation (8) applies and allows us to conclude
that
pred(obs(p)) ∩ pred(obs(ν(p)) = ∅ .
Via Equation (3), the latter two of the four conditions imply that p ∈ Por and ν(p) ∈ Por . Thus we may
restrict ν to Por to obtain a map
S : Por → Por ,
which in light of the first part of this proof exhibits at least one p ∈ Por which satisfies (4). Thus we have
shown that an or-substitution exists. Since o was arbitrary, it follows that a universal substitution exists.
The intuition behind this proof is very simple. In virtue of our assumption that theories of consciousness
need to be minimally informative, for any dataset o, there is another dataset o′ which makes a non-overlapping
prediction. But in virtue of inference and prediction data being independent, we can find a variation that
changes the prediction content as prescribed by o and o′, but keeps the inference content constant. This
suffices to show that there exists a transformation S as required by the definition of a substitution.
Combining this result with Proposition 3.7, we finally can state our main theorem.
Theorem 3.10. If inference and prediction data are independent, either every single inference operation is
wrong or the theory under consideration is already falsified.
Proof. The theorem follows by combining Proposition 3.9 and Proposition 3.7.
In the next section, we give several examples of universal substitutions, before discussing various possible
responses to our result in Section ??.
3.4.4 Examples of data independence
Our main theorem shows that testing a theory of consciousness will necessarily lead to its falsification
if inference and prediction data are independent (Definition 3.8), and if at least one single inference can
be trusted (Theorem 3.10). In this section, we give several examples that illustrate the independence of
inference and prediction data. We take report to mean output, behavior, or verbal report itself and assume
that prediction data derives from internal measurements.
Artificial neural networks. ANNs, particularly those trained using deep learning, have grown increasingly
powerful and capable of human-like performance (LeCun et al., 2015; Bojarski et al., 2016). For any ANN,
report (output) is a function of node states. Crucially, this function is non-injective, i.e. some nodes are not
part of the output. E.g., in deep learning, the report is typically taken to consist of the last layer of the ANN,
while the hidden layers are not taken to be part of the output. Correspondingly, for any given inference data,
one can construct a ANN with arbitrary prediction data by adding nodes, changing connections and changing
those nodes which are not part of the output. Put differently, one can always substitute a given ANN with
another with different internal observables but identical or near-identical reports. From a mathematical
perspective it is well-known that both feed-forward ANNs and recurrent ANNs can approximate any given
function (Hornik et al., 1989; Scha¨fer and Zimmermann, 2006). Since reports are just some function, it
follows that there are viable universal substitutions.
A special case thereof is the unfolding transformation considered in Doerig et al. (2019) in the context
of IIT. The arguments in this paper constitute a proof of the fact that for ANNs, inference and prediction
data are independent (Definition 3.8). Crucially, our main theorem shows that this has implications for
all minimally informative theories of consciousness. A similar result (using a different characterization of
theories of consciousness than minimally informative) has been shown in (Kleiner, 2020).
Universal computers. Turing machines are extremely different in architecture than ANNs. Since they
are capable of universal computation (Turing, 1937) they should provide an ideal candidate for a universal
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substitution. Indeed, this is exactly the reasoning behind the Turing test of conversational artificial intelli-
gence (Turing, 2009). Therefore, if one believes it is possible for a sufficiently fast Turing machine to pass
the Turing test, one needs to accept that substitutions exist. Notably, Turing machines are just one example
of universal computation, and there are other instances of different parameter spaces or physical systems
that are capable thereof, such as cellular automata (Wolfram, 1984).
Universal intelligences. There are models of universal intelligence that allow for maximally intelligent
behavior across any set of tasks (Hutter, 2003). For instance, consider the AIXI model, the gold-standard
for universal intelligence, which operates via Solomonoff induction (Solomonoff, 1964; Hutter, 2004). The
AIXI model generates an optimal decision making over some class of problems, and methods linked to it
have already been been applied to a range of behaviors, such as creating “AI physicists” (Wu and Tegmark,
2019). Its universality indicates it is a prime candidate for universal substitutions. Notably, unlike a Turing
machine, it avoids issues of precisely how it is accomplishing universal substitution of report, since the
algorithm that governs the AIXI model behavior is well-described and “relatively” simple.
The above are all real and viable classes of systems that are used everyday in science and engineering
which all provide different viable universal substitutions if inferences are based on reports or outputs. They
show that in normal experimental setups such as the ones commonly used in neuroscientific research into
consciousness (Frith et al., 1999), inference and prediction data are indeed independent, and dependency
is not investigated nor properly considered. It is always possible to substitute the physical system under
consideration with another that has different internal observables, and therefore different predictions, but
similar or identical reports. Indeed, recent research in using the work introduced in this work shows that
even different spatiotemporal models of a system can be substituted for one another, leading to falsification
(Hanson and Walker, 2020). We have not considered possible but less reasonable examples of universal
substitutions, like astronomically-large look-up ledgers of reports.
As an example of our Main Theorem 3.10, we consider the case of IIT. Since the theory is normally applied
in Boolean networks, logic gates, or artificial neural networks, one usually takes report to mean “output.”
In this case, it has already been proven that systems with different internal structures and hence different
predicted experiences, can have identical input/output (and therefore identical reports or inferences about
report) (Albantakis and Tononi, 2019). To take another case: within IIT it has already been acknowledged
that a Turing machine may have a wildly different predicted contents of consciousness for the same behavior
or reports (Koch, 2019). Therefore, data independence during testing has already been shown to apply to
IIT under its normal assumptions.
4 Inference and prediction data are strictly dependent
An immediate response to our main result would be to claim that it offers support of theories which define
conscious experience in terms of what is accessible to report. This is the case, e.g., for behaviourist theories
of consciousness but might arguably also be the case for some interpretations of global workspace theory or
fame in the brain proposals. In this section, we show that this response is not valid, as theories of this kind,
where inference and prediction data are strictly dependent, are empirically unfalsifiable.
In order to analyse this case, we first need to say something about unfalsifiable theories of consciousness.
Clearly, the goal of the scientific study as a whole is to find, eventually, a theory of consciousness that
cannot be falsified in experimental situations, because it is compatible with all experimental evidence. This
is a necessary condition (though not sufficient) any purportedly “true” theory of consciousness needs to
satisfy. Therefore, unfalsifiability per se is not a bad thing. However, unfasifiability can also be due to
pathological assumptions that underlie a theory of consciousness, assumptions which render an experimental
investigation meaningless. Specifically, a pathological dependence between inferences and predictions leads
to theories which are empirically unfalsifiable.
Such empirically unfalsifiable theories can be identified neatly in our formalism. To see how, recall that O
denotes the class of all datasets that can result from an experiment under investigation. Put differently, it
contains all datasets that can appear in nature when probed in the experiment. This is not the class of all
possible datasets of type O one can think of. Many datasets which are of the same form as elements of O
might simply not arise in the experiment under consideration. We denote the class of all possible datasets
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as:
O : All possible datasets of type O .
By construction, O is a subset of O, which describes which among the possible datasets actually arises across
experimental trails. Hence, O also determines which theory of consciousness is compatible with (i.e. not
falsified by) the experimental investigation.
Introduction of O allows us to distinguish the pathological and non-pathological cases of unfalsifiability
mentioned above. Whereas any purportedly true theory should only be unfalsifiable with respect to the
experimental data O, a pathological unfalsifiability pertains if a theory cannot be falsified at all, i.e. over O.
This is captured by the following definition.
Definition 4.1. A theory of consciousness which does not have a falsification over O is empirically unfal-
sifiable.
Here, we use the term ‘empirically unfalsifiable’ to highlight and refer to the pathological notion of unfalsifi-
ability. Intuitively speaking, a theory which satisfies this definition appears to be true independently of any
experimental investigation, and without the need for any such investigation. Using O, we can also define the
notion of strict dependence in a useful way.
Definition 4.2. Inference and prediction data are strictly dependent if there is a function f such that for
any o ∈ O, we have oi = f(or).
This definition says that there exists a function f which for every possible inference data or allows to
deduce the prediction data oi. We remark that the definition refers to O and not O, as the dependence of
inference and prediction considered here holds by assumption and is not simply asserting a contingency in
nature.
The definition is satisfied, for example, if inference data is equal to prediction data, i.e. if oi = or, where f
is simply the identity. This is the case, e.g., for behaviourist theories (Skinner, 1938) of consciousness,
where consciousness is equated directly with report or behavior, or for precursors of functionalist theories of
consciousness that are based on behavior or input/output (Putnam, 1960). The definition is also satisfied in
the case where prediction data is always a subset of the inference data:
oi ⊆ or . (10)
Here, f is simply the restriction function. This arguably applies to global workspace theory (Baars, 2005),
the “attention schema” theory of consciousness (Graziano and Webb, 2015) or “fame in the brain” (Dennett,
1993) proposals.
In all these cases, consciousness is generated by – and hence needs to be predicted via – what is accessible
to report or output. In terms of Block’s distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access conscious-
ness (Block, 1996), Equation (10) holds true whenever a theory of consciousness is under investigation where
access consciousness determines phenomenal consciousness.
Our second main theorem is the following.
Theorem 4.3. If a theory of consciousness implies that inference and prediction data are strictly dependent,
then it is either already falsified or empirically unfalsifiable.
Proof. To prove the theorem, it is useful to consider the inference and prediction content of datasets explicitly.
The possible pairings that can occur in an experiment are given by
Oexp := { (oi, or) | o ∈ O } , (11)
where we have again used our notation that oi denotes the prediction data of o, and similar for or. To define
the possible pairings that can occur in O, we let Oi denote the class of all prediction contents that arise in O,
and Or denote the class of all inference contents that arise in O. The set of all conceivable pairings is then
given by
Oall :={ (oi, o′r) | o ∈ O, o′ ∈ O} (12)
={ (oi, o′r) | oi ∈ Oi, o′r ∈ Or } . (13)
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Crucially, here, oi and o
′
r do not have to be part of the same dataset o. Combined with Definition 2.1, we
conclude that there is a falsification over O if for some (oi, o
′
r) ∈ Oall, we have inf(o) /∈ pred(o′), and there
is a falsification over O if for some (oi, or) ∈ Oexp, we have inf(o) /∈ pred(o).
Next we show that if inference and prediction data are strictly dependent, then Oall = Oexp holds. We
start with the set Oall as defined in (12). Expanding this definition in words, it reads
Oall = { (di, dr) | ∃ o ∈ O such that dr = or and ∃ o˜ ∈ O such that di = o˜i } , (14)
where we have symbols di and dr to denote prediction and inference data independently of any dataset o.
Assume that the first condition in this expression, dr = or holds for some o ∈ O. Since inference and
prediction data are strictly dependent, we have di = f(dr). Furthermore, for the same reason, the prediction
content oi of the dataset o satisfies oi = f(or). Applying the function f to both sides of the first condition
gives f(dr) = f(or), which thus in turn implies oi = di. This means that the o that satisfies the first condition
in (14) automatically also satisfies the second condition. Therefore, due to inference and prediction data
being strictly dependent, (14) is equivalent to
Oall = { (di, dr) | ∃ o ∈ O such that dr = or and di = oi } . (15)
This, however, is exactly Oexp as defined in (11). Thus we conclude that if inference and prediction data are
strictly dependent, Oall = Oexp necessarily holds.
Returning to the characterisation of falsification in terms of Oexp and Oall above, what we have just found
implies that there is a falsification over O if and only if there is a falsification over O. Thus either there is a
falsification over O, in which case the theory is already falsified or there is no falsification over O, in which
case the theory under consideration is empirically unfalsifiable.
The gist of this proof is that if inference and prediction data are strictly dependent, then as far as the
inference and prediction contents go, O and O are the same. I.e, the experiment does not add anything to
the evaluation of the theory. It is sufficient to know only all possible datasets to decide whether there is
a falsification. In practise, this would mean that knowledge of the experimental design (which reports are
to be collected, on the one hand, which possible data a measurement device can produce, one the other) is
sufficient to evaluate the theory, which is clearly at odds with the role of empirical evidence required in any
scientific investigation. Thus such theories are empirically unfalsifiable.
To give an intuitive example of the theorem, let us examine a theory that uses the information accessible
to report in a system to predict conscious experience (perhaps this information is “famous” in the brain
or is within some accessible global workspace). In terms of our notation, we can assume that or denotes
everything that is accessible to report, and oi denotes that part which is used by the theory to predict
conscious experience. Thus in this case we have oi ⊆ or. Since the predicted contents are always part of
what can be reported, there can never be any mismatch between reports and predictions. However, this is
not only the case for Oexp but also, in virtue of the theory’s definition, for all possible datasets, i.e., Oall.
Therefore such theories are empirically unfalsifiable. Experiments add no information to whether the theory
is true or not, and such theories are empirically uninformative or tautological.
5 Objections
In this section, we discuss a number of possible objections to our results.
5.1 Restricting inferences to humans only
The examples given in Section 3.4.4 show that data independence holds during the usual testing setups.
This is because prima facie it seems reasonable to base inferences either on report capability or intelligent
behavior in a manner agnostic of the actual physical makeup of the system. Yet this entails independence,
so in these cases our conclusions apply.
One response to our results might be to restrict all testing of theories of consciousness solely to humans.
In our formalisms this is equivalent to making the strength of inferences based not on reports themselves
but on an underlying biological homology. Such an inf function may still pick out specific experiences via
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reports, but the weight of the inference is carried by homology rather than report or behavior. This would
mean that the substitution argument does not significantly affect consciousness research, as reports of non-
human systems would simply not count. Theories of consciousness, so this idea goes, would be supported
by abductive reasoning from testing in humans alone.
Overall there are strong reasons to reject this restriction of inferences. One significant issue is that
this objection is equivalent to saying that reports or behavior in non-humans carry no information about
consciousness. Even if non-humans contradicted a theory (like an organism acting in pain while a theory
predicted a lack of pain) the theory would be presumed to be correct above any behavior or report. This
is highly problematic for consciousness research which often uses non-human animal models (Boly et al.,
2013). For instance, cephalopods are among the most intelligent animals yet are quite distant on the tree of
life from humans and have a distinct neuroanatomy, and still are used for consciousness research (Mather,
2008). Even in artificial intelligence research, there is increasing evidence that deep neural networks produced
brain-like structures such as grid cells, shape tuning, and visual illusions, and many others (Richards et al.,
2019). Given these similarities, it becomes questionable why the strength of inferences should be based on
homology instead of capability of report, intelligence, or even functionally brain-like structures.
What is more, restricting inferences to humans alone might not be sufficient to avoid our results. De-
pending on the theory under consideration, data independence might exist just in human brains alone. That
is, it is probable that there are transformations (as in Equation (9)) available within the brain wherein or is
fixed but oi varies. This is particularly true once one allows for interventions on the human brain by experi-
menters, such as perturbations like transcranial magnetic stimulation, which is already used in consciousness
research (Rounis et al., 2010; Napolitani et al., 2014).
For these reasons this objection does not appear viable. At minimum it is clear that if the objection
were taken seriously, it would imply significant changes to consciousness research which would make the field
extremely restricted with strong a priori assumptions.
5.2 Reductio ad absurdum
Another hypothetical objection to our results is to argue that they could just as well be applied to scientific
theories in other fields. If this turned out to be true this wouldn’t imply our argument is necessarily incorrect.
But the fact that other scientific theories do not seem especially problematic with regard to falsification would
generate the question of whether some assumption is illegitimately strong. In order to address this, we explain
which of our assumptions is specific to theories of consciousness and wouldn’t hold when applied to other
scientific theories. Subsequently, we give an example to illustrate this point.
The assumption in question is that O, the class of all datasets that can result from observations or
measurements of a system, is determined by the physical configurations in P alone. I.e., every single dataset o,
including both its prediction content oi and its inference content or, is determined by p, and not by a conscious
experience in E. In Figure 2, this is reflected in the fact that there is an arrow from P to O, but no arrow
from E to O.
This assumption expresses the standard paradigm of testing theories of consciousness in neuroscience,
according to which both the data used to predict a state of consciousness and the reports of a system are
determined by its physical configuration alone. This, in turn, may be traced back to consciousness’ assumed
subjective and private nature, which implies that any empirical access to states of consciousness in scientific
investigations is necessarily mediated by a subject’s reports, and to general physicalist assumptions.
This is different from experiments in other natural sciences. If there are two quantities of interest whose
relation is to be modelled by a scientific theory, then in all reasonable cases there are two independent means
of collecting information relevant to a test of the theory, one providing a dataset that is determined by the
first quantity, and one providing a dataset that is determined by the second quantity.
Consider, as an example, the case of temperature T and its relation to microphysical states. To apply
our argument, the temperature T would replace the experience space E and p would denote a microphyiscal
configuration. In order to test any particular theory about how temperature is determined by microphysical
states, one would make use of two different measurements. The first measurement would access the mi-
crophysical states and would allow measurement of, say, the mean kinetic energy (if that’s what the theory
under consideration utilizes). This first measurement would provide a dataset om that replaces the prediction
data oi above. For the second measurement, one would use a thermometer or some other measuring device
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to obtain a dataset ot that replaces our inference data or above. Comparison of the inferred temperature
with the temperature that is predicted based on om would allow testing of the theory under consideration.
These independent means provide independent access to each of the two datasets in question. Combining
om and ot in one dataset o, the diagrammatic representation is
P −→ O←− T ,
which differs from the case of theories of consciousness considered here, wherein the physical system deter-
mines both datasets.
5.3 Theories could be based on phenomenology
Another response to the issue of independence/dependence identified here is to propose that a theory of
consciousness may not have to be falsified but can be judged by other characteristics. This is reminiscent of
ideas put forward in connection with String Theory, which some have argued can be judged by elegance or
parsimony alone (Carroll, 2018).
In addition to elegance and parsimony, in consciousness science, one could in particular consider a theory’s
fit with phenomenology, i.e. how well a theory describes the general structure of conscious experience.
Examples of theories that are constructed based on a fit with phenomenology are recent versions of IIT
(Oizumi et al., 2014) or any view that proposes developing theories based on isomorphisms between the
structure of experiences and the structure of physical systems or processes (Tsuchiya et al., 2019).
It might be suggested that phenomenological theories might be immune to aspects of the issues we outline
in our results (Negro, 2020). We emphasize that in order to avoid our results, and indeed the need for any
experimental testing at all, a theory constructed from phenomenology has to be uniquely derivable from
conscious experience. However, to date, no such derivation exists, as phenomenology seems to generally
undermine the postulates of IIT (Bayne, 2018; Barrett and Mediano, 2019), and because it is unknown what
the scope and nature of non-human experience is. Therefore theories based on phenomenology can only
confidently identify systems with human-like conscious experiences and cannot currently do so uniquely.
Thus they cannot avoid the need for testing.
As long as no unique and correct derivation exists across the space of possible conscious experiences, the
use of experimental tests to assess theories of consciousness, and hence our results, cannot be avoided.
5.4 Rejecting falsifiability
Another response to our findings might be to deny the importance of falsifications within the scientific
methodology. Such responses may reference a Lakatosian conception of science, according to which science
does not proceed by discarding theories immediately upon falsification, but instead consists of research
programs built around a family of theories (Lakatos, 1980). These research programs have a protective belt
which consists of non-essential assumptions that are required to make predictions, and which can easily be
modified in response to falsifications, as well as a hard core that is immune to falsifications. Within the
Lakatosian conception of science research programs are either progressive or degenerating based on whether
they can “anticipate theoretically novel facts in its growth” or not (Lakatos, 1980).
It is important to note, however, that Lakatos does not actually break with falsificationism. This is why
Lakatos description of science is often called “refined falsificationism” in philosophy of science (Radnitzky,
1991). Thus cases of testing theories’ predictions remain relevant in a Lakatosian view in order to distinguish
between progressive and degenerating research programs. Therefore our results generally translate into this
view of scientific progress. In particular, Theorem 3.10 shows that for every single inference procedure that
is taken to be valid, there exists a system for which the theory makes a wrong prediction. This implies
necessarily that a research program is degenerating. That is, independence implies that there is always an
available substitution that can falsify any particular prediction coming from the research program.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have subjected the usual scheme for testing theories of consciousness to a thorough formal
analysis. We have shown that there appear to be deep problems inherent in this scheme which need to be
16
addressed.
Crucially, in contrast to other similar results (Doerig et al., 2019), we do not put the blame on individual
theories of consciousness, but rather show that a key assumption that is usually being made is responsible
for the problems: an experimenter’s inference about consciousness and a theory’s predictions are generally
implicitly assumed to be independent during testing across contemporary theories. As we formally prove,
if this independence holds, substitutions or changes to physical systems are possible that falsify any given
contemporary theory. Whenever there is an experimental test of a theory of consciousness on some physical
system which does not lead to a falsification, there necessary exists another physical system which, if it had
been tested, would have produced a falsification of that theory. We emphasize that this problem does not
only affect one particular type of theory, for example those based on causal interactions like IIT; theorems
apply to all contemporary neuroscientific theories of consciousness if independence holds.
In the second part of our results, we examine the case where independence doesn’t hold. We show that
if an experimenter’s inferences about consciousness and a theory’s predictions are instead considered to be
strictly dependent, empirical unfalsifiability follows, which renders any type of experiment to test a theory
uninformative. This affects all theories wherein consciousness is predicted off of reports or behavior (such as
behaviorism), theories based off of input/output functions, and also theories that equate consciousness with
on accessible or reportable information.
Thus theories of consciousness seem caught between between Scylla and Charybdis, requiring delicate
navigation. In our opinion there may only be two possible paths forward to avoid these dilemmas, which
we briefly outline below. Each requires a revision of the current scheme of testing or developing theories of
consciousness.
Lenient dependency. When combined, our main theorems show that both independence and strict depen-
dence of inference and prediction data are problematic and thus neither can be assumed in an experimental
investigation. This raises the question of whether there are reasonable cases where inference and prediction
are dependent, but not strictly dependent.
A priori, in the space of possible relationships between inference and prediction data, there seems to be
room for relationships that are neither independent (Section 3) nor strictly dependent (Section 4). We define
this relationships of this kind as cases of lenient dependency. No current theory or testing paradigm that
we know of satisfies this definition. Yet cases of lenient dependency cannot be excluded to exist. Such cases
would technically not be beholden to either Theorem 3.10 or Theorem 4.3.
There seems to be two general possibilities of how lenient dependencies could be built. On the one
hand, one could hope to find novel forms of inference that allow to surpass the problems we have identified
here. This would likely constitute a major change in the methodologies of experimental testing of theories
of consciousness. On the other hand, another possibility to attain lenient dependence would be to construct
theories of consciousness which yield prediction functions that are designed to explicitly have a leniently
dependent link to inference functions. This would likely constitute a major change in constructing theories
of consciousness.
Physics is not causally closed. Another way to avoid our conclusion is to only consider theories of
consciousness which do not describe the physical as causally closed (Kim, 1998). That is, the presence or
absence of a particular experience itself would have to make a difference to the configuration, dynamics,
or states of physical systems above and beyond what would be predicted with just information about the
physical system itself. If a theory of consciousness does not describe the physical as closed, a whole other
range of predictions are possible: predictions which concern the physical domain itself, e.g., changes in the
dynamics of the system which depend on the dynamics of conscious experience. These predictions are not
considered in our setup and may serve to test a theory of consciousness without the problems we have
explored here.
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